A reunified pro-American Korea could serve as launch pad for a future invasion of China that would directly strike China's industrial heartland in Manchuria.
Concern for China's north-eastern border was highlighted by the creation of the , strong Northeast Border Defense Army in July , 26 before China had even decided to intervene in Korea. It should also be noted that as of October China was not only concerned about its north-east border.
The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psychocultural View.
Victory in Korea would mean that China would have to divide its forces less to defend its territory. The fourth issue regarding Chinese intervention in Korea were the specific political goals and opportunities Mao pursued by intervening in Korea as well as its political justifications for intervening.
In his visit to Moscow, Mao had agreed with Stalin to divide the responsibility of expanding the communist revolution between them, 28 leaving Mao responsible of communising East Asia.
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US intervention in Korea may have also been fuelled by feelings of US provocation and encroachment. Nationalist troops still boasted air and naval superiority thanks to their US-made ships and planes and the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait at the outbreak of the Korean Crisis made the liberation of Taiwan a long-standing aim of the PRC impossible.
An extremely important perspective on why China intervened in Korea is that of domestic politics. When the question was first raised as to whether Chinese troops should intervene in Korea, there was much domestic opposition in China, view such an action as immoral or dangerous. This campaign was designed to stir up hatred amongst ordinary Chinese towards the US and preparing them for an inevitable conflict against their 'weakening' and long time political and economic abuser.
At the same time, the CCP promoted a nationwide campaign to suppress "reactionaries and reactionary activities" to silence any remaining dissenters. These domestic issues and solutions did not purely relate to the facilitation of PRC foreign policy however.
Shi, Zhiyu [WorldCat Identities]
October marked the first anniversary of the PRC, a country that remained divided and devastated by many years of war. Mao felt that a successful intervention in Korea would enhance the revolutionary zeal of the people and solidify the CCP's position as China's new leader.
With this newfound authority and public enthusiasm created by pre-intervention campaigns and the intervention itself, Mao believed this would serve as a base for his ambitions for economic development and social engineering. Before concluding, there is another interesting question regarding Chinese intervention in Korea, the role of US nuclear weapons on Mao's thinking. Why would Mao send troops even ones disguised as volunteers to fight the US military, who had a monopoly on weapons capable of terrifying destruction?
Enyu Zhang and Qingmin Zhang
This can be explained by Mao's rather dismissive attitude towards nuclear weapons. Mao was believer that wars are decided by a country's people, not weapons. Mao also dismissed the idea that such weapons could decide a war as a product of "bourgeois world outlook and methodology" and should be dismissed. To conclude, Mao's motivations for intervening the Korean War were wide ranging in nature.
Mao intervened to support his allies in the communist bloc, to protect Chinese territorial security, advance domestic goals and pursue political goals in foreign policy. These realist motivations of intervention were backed up by Mao's ideological views based on Marxist-Leninism and traditional Chinese attitudes and done in the face of numerous risks, including nuclear annihilation.
Kovach, C. Kovach, Ciaran. Interstate - Journal of International Affairs. JournalQuest is a free program to help academic student publications increase online readership and distribution. If you are interested in enrolling a journal at your school, please visit the JournalQuest website. The newsletter highlights recent selections from the journal and useful tips from our blog.
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Revolution and Chinese foreign policy : Peking's support for wars of national liberation London ; Berkeley : University of California Press, , p. Mackerras, C and Fung, E. Van Ness, P. Revolution and Chinese foreign policy : Peking's support for wars of national liberation London; Berkeley : University of California Press, , p.
Shin, C. The spirit of Chinese foreign policy : a psychocultural view Basingstoke : Macmillan, , p. Ho Chung, J. Jian, C. William Stueck.
What Were Mao's Motivations for Intervention in the Korean War?
Lexington, Ky. Popular Features. New Releases. Description This psychological interpretation of Chinese diplomatic history considers both the universal psychocultural processes and the uniqueness of China as a nation. It also attempts to establish some interaction between social science and Sinology, and examines behaviour by Chinese statesmen.
Product details Format Paperback pages Dimensions x x Shih's culturally and historically specific arguments are powerful. Shih outlines the diplomatic principles cherished by the Chinese—socialism, antihegemonism, peaceful coexistence, statism, and isolationism—and explores how each has been applied in the past forty years. He argues, for example, that China's policy toward the Soviet Union was aimed primarily at shaming the Soviets for their betrayal of socialism; its U.
The application of these principles has enabled Beijing always to find a moral niche in world affairs; the seeming contradiction among the principles has been ignored, because the need to clarify China's moral role outweighs other national interests. This unusual perspective on China's foreign affairs also challenges the realist calculation of national interests, one couched purely in terms of military balance or economic development.